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Reforming school science education in the light of pupil views 
and the boundaries of science 
 
Michael J. Reiss 
 
What are the boundaries of science and how should science be represented in 
schools? There is a need to develop science curricula and teaching approaches 
to broaden what is commonly taught in school science 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The science education provided in schools is still a narrow version which 
generally gives pupils only a partial understanding of either the scope of 
science or its achievements. Yet consideration of what most pupils want and 
of the boundaries of science argues for a richer science curriculum. Such a 
move makes intellectual sense and is feasible. It should lead to science 
teaching being more satisfying for pupils and science teachers alike. 
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Where was the chap I saw in that picture somewhere? Ah, in the 
dead sea, floating on his back, reading a poem with a parasol 
open. Couldn't sink if you tried: so thick with salt. Because the 
weight of the water, no the weight of the body in the water is 
equal to the weight of the. Or is it the volume is equal to the 
weight? It's a law something like that. Vance in High school 
cracking his fingerjoints, teaching. The college curriculum. 
Cracking curriculum. What is weight really when you say the 
weight? Thirtytwo feet per second, per second. Law of falling 
bodies: per second, per second. They all fall to the ground. The 
earth. It's the force of gravity of the earth is the weight. 
Joyce (1922/68) p. 73 
 
 
Ulysses is not a book principally concerned with attempts to reform science 
curricula but Joyce succeeds in capturing in Mr Bloom's recollections what 
must be typical of many people's memories of school science: a hodgepodge 
of half-remembered scientific laws (Archimedes' principle) dressed up with 
the occasional attempt to enable understanding, enhance memory or regain 
interest through the mention of an apparently surprising phenomenon 
(floating in the Dead Sea). 
 
Nor are Mr Bloom's recollections of his school science lessons atypical. Six 
years ago, as part of a longitudinal study I am undertaking, I asked the 
parents of a group of 21 pupils about their memories of science at school. 
Most of them had had fairly negative experiences (Reiss, 2000). Peter's 
mother, for example, told me that she had stopped doing science before she 
did her CSEs. 'All I remember is Bunsen burners and test tubes and being 
fined 5p.' The fine was for breaking some science equipment. They used to do 
dissection in biology and she found that 'horrible ... Also had to go out and 
collect snails and collect worms and make a wormery and my Mum was 
disgusted'. 
 
Paul's mother, when I asked her 'Could you tell me a bit about your 
education please?' initially replied 'Don't bother with me. Not worth it'. The 
school she went to was for 'the 11+ failures ... There was no intake for a year 
because they weren't sure whether to close us'. All pupils 'had to do 
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chemistry and biology or physics and chemistry. I did chemistry and biology. 
I couldn't understand chemistry. If I'd been allowed to do physics I would 
have understood it ... chemistry teacher hated me and said in front of me “She 
came from a council estate so what can you expect”'. Paul's mother told me 
that they 'all failed biology because they put us in for the wrong syllabus ...'. 
 
There were some positive memories of school science among this sample, but, 
for both the mothers and the fathers, these were in the minority. What I found 
particularly interesting was that almost all of the parents, despite their own 
fairly negative experiences, were emphatic that science should be taught to all 
pupils in schools. When I asked the parents why they felt this, the most 
frequently given answers were to do with science deepening one's 
understanding, for example: 
 
... Science is life really. It's everything around us. It's important 
to give children a chance to look deeply into natural science as 
well as all the other scientific areas. (Catherine's mother) 
 
It's a basic part of understanding the world we live in ... 
(Edward's father) 
 
I think it's very noticeable that when you meet people who 
don't have any science, they don't realise how much they don't 
know. (Jack's father) 
 
... I think it's nice to know how everything functions in your 
body ... (Martin's mother) 
 
... I certainly think they should be taught how the world works 
... (Martin's father) 
 
... we live in such a technological age ... (Mary's mother) 
 
My research was an in depth study of just one group of school pupils. 
Jonathan Osborne and Sue Collins have run focus groups with parents, 
teachers and 16-year-old pupils in London, Leeds and Birmingham (Osborne 
and Collins, 2000). One of their findings, similarly, was that pupils and their 
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parents all considered science to be important. It was seen as a prestigious 
subject and valued for the understanding it offered of the natural world. 
 
Indeed, in almost all countries science is privileged with regard to its position 
in school curricula. Here I shall attempt to argue how we should represent 
science in education. In the space available this is, I admit, a somewhat 
ambitious enterprise as it requires some consideration both of the scope of 
science and of the purposes it might serve within education. 
 
 
Science and reality 
 
Let me assert baldly that science is one way of representing reality. I am not 
so interested here in the fact that there are other ways of representing reality 
– something that is unlikely to be news to those with a knowledge of other 
disciplines but is still deeply troubling to a number of vocal scientists who 
believe that only science can validly represent reality. Rather I am interested 
in the extent to which every representation of requires the excision and 
positioning of reality. 
 
Michael Matthews has emphasised how in his work on pendulum motion 
Galileo consistently went beyond what his results showed him, something for 
which his opponents at the time continually criticised him (Matthews, 2000). 
Let us return briefly to Joyce's Mr Bloom with his recollection of 'Thirtytwo 
feet per second, per second'. As we know, this is a constant, approximately 
the value (in imperial units, now more or less outlawed from UK science 
textbooks as from our shops) of the acceleration of an object as it falls under 
the influence of gravity. 
 
Except, of course, that it isn't. It is the value of the acceleration of an object as 
it falls in a vacuum under the influence of gravity. Now in Galileo's time, a 
vacuum, in a very real sense, did not exist on Earth. It did, though, exist in 
Galileo's mind. Part of the genius of Galileo was to wonder how an object 
would fall under gravity if there was no air resistance, i.e. in a vacuum. It was 
the same quality of thinking that led Einstein to wonder what would happen 
if he could travel at the speed of light and that led Darwin to realise that 
inheritance and the everyday effects of competition could lead to the huge 
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diversity of life we see today in direct descent from the humblest inorganic 
precursors many hundreds of millions of years ago. 
 
Sadly, school and even college textbooks of science almost always fail to 
discuss this important way in which science is an abstraction of reality as well 
as an approximation to it. For example, Maria Rodriguez and Mansoor Niaz 
have studied over 50 general physics textbooks and laboratory manuals to see 
how they portray Millikan's classic series of oil drop experiments. These oil 
drop experiments are beautifully elegant. Thanks to Nuffield advanced level 
physics, under Paul Black and Jon Ogborn, they were introduced to English 
VIth form students some thirty years ago. I remember being fascinated, 
indeed entranced, by them when I was at school. The observations Millikan 
made allowed him to conclude that the electrical charges found on objects all 
have exactly the same value or else exact multiples of that value. We know 
this value as the charge on an electron. 
 
This is the conclusion preached in every science textbook that covers the 
subject. However, R. A. Millikan and F. Ehrenhaft spent the best parts of their 
careers disagreeing about this. As late as 1941, over 30 years after Millikan 
first reached his conclusions, Ehrenhaft was still concluding that charges 
considerably less than this were consistently found. It has been argued that 
there was never a laboratory disproof of Ehrenhaft's (Rodriguez and Niaz, 
2001). 
 
 
Representing the ways in which scientists work 
 
Ever since the introduction of the National Curriculum in England and Wales 
in 1989, the notion that there is a single best way of carrying out a scientific 
investigation has been enshrined in legislation. Although the current revision 
of the science National Curriculum has improved affairs, it remains the case 
that most pupils end their mandatory science education (sometimes 
overenthusiastically referred to as their 'entitlement for science education') 
with a very narrow understanding of what science is and how it is carried out 
(Driver et al., 1996; Donnelly and Jenkins, 1999). 
 
For one thing, we don't do a very good job of getting children in school 
science lessons either to ask the sorts of questions that scientists actually ask 
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or to ask the sorts of questions that the rest of us ask and to which science can 
make a contribution. Instead we restrict pupils to mind-blowingly dull 
questions about the bouncing of squash  balls or the dissolving of sugar in 
what are misleadingly termed 'scientific investigations'. We also succeed in 
persuading most people that they aren't good at science. Here, for example, is 
the start of an article titled 'Science quiz' published in the Spring 2001 issue of 
Insight, 'The Magazine for Education and Business' published by the then 
Department for Education and Employment: 
 
Which is the most common alkali? Who invented the 
motorcycle? In which city did the world's first public television 
service start in 1936? 
 
Questions like these feature in the School Science Race 2001. 
Run by the Engineering and Physical Science Research Council 
(EPSRC) and sponsored by telecom company Alcatel, the 
Science Race is held during National Science Week. 
Anon (2001) p. 16 
 
I am delighted to say that I don't know the answer to any of these three 
questions nor have I the faintest interest in so doing. On a more positive note, 
research has shown the extent to which people when faced with issues of 
personal significance where a knowledge and understanding of science is of 
value are capable not only of understanding a great deal of science but of 
being able to appreciate the limitations of scientific understanding – for 
example about the concept of risk – in a way which many scientists are not 
(ESRC Global Environmental Change Programme, 1999). 
 
Let me be personal. In my own, brief, career as a research scientist, I worked 
in the zoology department of a reputable university. Yet I carried out two 
quite different types of scientific work. One involved field work on the 
behaviour of red deer. Here, being a good scientist meant such things as 
being able to find particular deer (which might take an hour or more), 
identify them, record their behaviour using techniques adapted from field 
anthropology and so on. The other type of scientific work involved 
constructing mathematical models to try to predict why animals were the size 
they were. Trying to explain why both types of work could be carried out in 
the same zoology department is quite difficult. Apart from the fact that each 
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involved original work on animals they had little in common. Interestingly 
enough, neither bit of work would have got me a high level on Attainment 
Target 1 (Sc1) of the science National Curriculum.  
 
A possible way further to illustrate the position that there is no one scientific 
method is to imagine a particular wood and then think of the ways in which a 
scientist might study it (Reiss and Tunnicliffe, 2001). There are many. For a 
start, a biologist would be most interested in the organisms in the wood, a 
climatologist would study such things as insolation, rainfall, aspect and wind 
and a geologist would focus on the underlying rocks and the consequences of 
these for the soil. 
 
Further, there are a great variety of ways in which just the biologists might 
work in such a wood. Even eschewing such obvious niche-specific roles 
occupied by those who define themselves as microbiologists, botanists, 
mycologists and zoologists, our wood will be full of ecologists, anatomists, 
biochemists, physiologists and even such difficult to classify creatures as 
Oliver Rackham, interested in the history of the wood as revealed by a 
variety of different approaches including dendrochronology, field 
archaeology and the study of place names. 
 
Indeed, we can subdivide further: our ecologists will include population 
biologists (counting the numbers of individuals within species and organising 
these individuals by age classes), ecological geneticists (concerned with any 
relationships between genomes and differential fitnesses), autecologists (each 
occupied with the ecology of a single species), synecologists (attempting to 
unravel the interrelationships between species), conservation biologists 
(concerned to prevent, through careful management based on thorough 
monitoring, the loss of species from the wood) and so on. 
 
In addition to the plethora of scientists now found investigating every aspect 
of this overcrowded wood, many other types of scientists exist though they 
are unlikely to be found studying this wood or any other or, which is perhaps 
more important, using the methods of biologists, climatologists and 
geologists. An analytical chemist, a theoretical physicist, a palaeontologist 
and a professor of cardiac surgery share little in common from a 
methodological standpoint. Indeed, attempts to produce a list of what unifies 
such a disparate group of people tend to end up generating criteria that 
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would include geographers, historians, economists and just about any one 
who seeks after testable truth. 
 
 
How many scientific truths are there? 
 
Someone might grudgingly agree that there are a wide variety of both 
scientific approaches (crudely, the 'processes' of science) and scientific 
domains (crudely, the 'contents' of the various sciences) but still insist on the 
existence of one actual reality. This fairly conventional view would entail 
believing that the universe (more formally, that large part of it susceptible to 
scientific enquiry) is so rich that no single scientific way of exploring it 
suffices; instead a variety of approaches are needed with these approaches 
being situated within relatively distinct (albeit overlapping) domains. In 
other words, there is a biology of a wood, a chemistry of a wood, a geology of 
a wood and so on, but there is just the one wood being studied! 
 
A more radical view, informed by post-modernism, would cheerfully assert 
that the wood being studied, while undoubtedly a single wood in everyday 
language, actually exists – or, at the very least, reveals itself – differently to 
different investigators. I won't rely on this more radical view but it is 
important to mention it here. To many, it may seem an absurd view but it 
may be easier to see its force if one imagines not a whole wood but a single 
species, say the grey squirrel, in the wood being studied. I need not rehearse 
again in any detail the various biological approaches to studying grey 
squirrels – anatomical, biochemical, physiological, behavioural and so on. But 
consider just the behavioural approach. 
 
At one extreme, imagine how such behaviourists as Pavlov (of Pavlov's dogs) 
and Skinner (designer of the Skinner box in which the learning of rats, 
pigeons and other animals can be quantitatively investigated) might proceed. 
They would probably obtain a number of grey squirrels and keep them in 
isolation or in small groups in carefully controlled laboratory settings. Here 
individual squirrels would be tested to see to which particular features of the 
environment allowed effective learning to take place. For example, do 
squirrels innately prefer certain materials from which to fashion a drey (nest)? 
How long do they take to learn which foods are edible and which are not? 
And so on. 
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At the other extreme, imagine how Jane Goodall (the pioneer of long-term, 
fieldwork in an animal's natural setting) might proceed. She would probably 
spend many months acclimatising the squirrels to herself and herself to their 
habitat. As she did so she would begin to notice patterns in their behaviours 
and to see the various squirrels as individuals. Undoubtedly she would give 
her study animals their own names, see signs in them of individual 
differences in personality and behaviour and begin to appreciate how they 
relate to one another. 
 
These two different approaches to studying the behaviour of squirrels, one 
experimental and interventionist, the other ethnographic and naturalistic, 
evidently reveal different understandings of what it is to be a grey squirrel. 
But in a sense, each approach brings into existence a different kind of grey 
squirrel. It might be objected that this is ridiculous. After all grey squirrels 
will carry on doing whatever they do irrespective of the relative extent to 
which they are studied by these two or any other approaches. 
 
However, even granted the truth of this assertion – an assertion which 
arguably belongs more to the realm of metaphysics than to that of science – it 
is certainly the case that what you or I think of as a grey squirrel is not just 
affected but determined by a blend of who each of us is and how squirrels 
have been studied and reported. After all, in the UK are grey squirrels vermin 
that should be exterminated, a valuable source of food and pelts or a much 
loved animal and one of the few British wild mammals people actually see in 
the countryside? 
 
Retreating now to the more easily accepted notion that while there may be a 
diversity of representations, that which they represent is a part of a single, 
objective reality, it remains the case that, as I have argued, there are a 
tremendous number of valid sciences. It is because of this that I have argued 
for some time that it can be useful, at least on occasions, to avoid the word 
'science' and instead talk about 'ethnosciences' (Reiss, 1993). It is because all 
science is set in a cultural milieu that we cannot validly locate a single global 
non-ethnoscientific science. 
 
This is not to maintain that all methodologies and findings, conducted in the 
name of science, are of equal validity. I suspect it is because talk of 
10 
ethnosciences implies this to some people that multicultural science is 
ridiculed or ignored by some. However, just as there is good historical 
research and bad historical research and just as we are more confident of 
some economic conclusions than of others so some scientific research is better 
than others and some scientific conclusions are more valid than others. 
 
 
The strengths and limitations of science 
 
Science has already been tremendously successful. One of its powerful 
successes is in the way in which many people have taken on board its big 
ideas, its metanarratives. Most people, in Europe, for example, accept that we 
live in a universe that is billions of years old, that the laws of nature are the 
same everywhere and at all times, that all matter is composed of only a 
hundred or so elements, and that humans have the other animals as their 
evolutionary relatives. Such knowledge, most of it unimaginable only a few 
centuries ago, is of huge cultural importance, undermining, though sadly not 
as much as would be healthy, our anthropocentrism. 
 
From a utilitarian point of view too, science has been of inestimable value. 
Working alongside technology, it has helped give many of us a regular food 
supply, clean drinking water, vaccines, medicines, long-distance transport, 
new communication systems and many other benefits. 
 
And yet, the limitations of science are only irregularly appreciated. In the 
nineteenth century William Whewell, who coined the word 'scientist', 
believed so strongly in the provisional nature of scientific truth that he 
argued that not until a century had passed could we be sure that scientific 
theories were true. Indeed, as every scientist knows, scientific truth, for all 
that it may be reliable for most purposes, by its very nature is provisional, 
which is another way of saying 'temporary'. Newtonian thinking may have 
ruled for three hundred years but even it eventually bowed to Einstein's 
views. What, though, is less often appreciated is the way in which the 
sciences represent reality by means of conceptual models. In one of Lewis 
Carroll's Alice books one of the characters talks about what would happen if a 
map was produced to the same scale and in as much detail as the ground. 
Would it still be a map? The same point holds about scientific models. They 
are abstractions of reality. The best ones are especially parsimonious – which 
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is why some physicists still hanker after GUT – the 'Grand Unified Theory', 
that mythical pearl of great price. 
 
Nor should it be supposed that today's scientific consensus is somehow 
immune from disruption. To give some examples from physics – because 
non-scientists sometimes suppose that physics is a more certain science than, 
for example, biology: 
• there is a controversy in aerodynamics as to whether the Bernoulli 
principle has any validity whatsoever; 
• it is unclear how most of the heaviest elements, such as gold and 
platinum, arose; 
• we still have little idea why the universe contains more matter than 
antimatter; 
• it is very unsure whether the standard model of particle physics is 
correct. 
 
Now, these scientific uncertainties may not cause many of us to lay awake at 
night. So consider the 2001 foot-and-mouth epidemic in the UK as this 
illustrates well both the strengths and the limitations of science. Perhaps the 
core strength of science in this instance was the way in which population 
biology was utilised directly to bring the disease under control in time for a 
general election. A disease as it spreads can only be brought under control if 
something is done to ensure that, on average, each case of the disease leads to 
fewer than one new case. It was this mathematical truth, combined with a lot 
of empirical data about infectivity rates, that led to the slaughter policy, in 
particular to the killing of animals within a certain distance of infection sites 
whether or not these animals showed any signs of infection. 
 
And yet the UK foot-and-mouth epidemic illustrates the limitations of science 
in two quite different ways. First of all, almost all the parameters that led to 
the specifics of the slaughter policy had a degree of uncertainty about them. 
In a very real sense, this was nobody's fault. No outbreak of a disease is 
exactly the same. In the case of foot-and-mouth, different strains have 
different characteristics and the various host species are affected differently. 
Science when it is used for applied ends almost inevitably oversimplifies 
complex matters. 
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But more fundamentally, the slaughter policy was exactly that – a policy, a set 
of political decisions. Science can play a part in the formulation of policy but 
so too do other domains of knowledge. The specifics of a slaughter 
programme depend on its precise aims. If the aim is to minimise the 
economic damage to UK agriculture, one set of recommendations follows. If 
the aim is to minimise the wider UK economic damage, another set of 
recommendations follows. If the aim is to minimise animal suffering and loss 
of life, then another set of recommendations follows – one that entails the 
widespread use of vaccination. 
 
Which of these aims is to be held is not a scientific decision. It is a decision 
about values. The same points about scientific uncertainty and the other 
limitations of science held about such foot-and-mouth questions as how to 
dispose of the slaughtered animals and when to lift restrictions on the 
movements of people and livestock. This leads me onto an argument about 
the demarcation of school science. 
 
 
The demarcation of school science 
 
When young people are asked about what sort of science they would like to 
be taught in schools, they generally talk about 'relevance' (Osborne and 
Collins, 2000; Reiss, 2000; Levinson and Turner, 2001). The notion of relevance 
in a school subject can be clarified and deconstructed but essentially it is 
about the making of meaningful connections between that subject and the 
world of the person concerned. 
 
None of us can make sense of all the aspects of the world. As we grow up we 
attend selectively to aspects of our environment and we develop preferred 
ways of learning and preferred categories of knowledge. Balint drew a 
distinction between oncophils and philobats. To use psychoanalytical 
language, oncophils over-cathect their object relationships while philobats 
over-cathect their own ego functions. This difference can most easily be seen 
in the behaviour of young children. The oncophil finds safety in objects 
including other people. At times of stress the intervening periods or spaces 
between objects are felt as dangerous. The philobat experiences objects as 
unreliable and hazardous, (S)he is inclined to dispense with them and seek 
13 
out what are perceived as the safer expanses separating objects in time and 
space (Balint, 1968/89). 
 
The reason I mention this is that somewhat similarly I suspect that certain 
people are intellectually attracted to those school subjects that require 
empathy with people or other organisms, while others are attracted to 
subjects that inhabit the periods or spaces between living objects. Science is 
distinctive in that parts of it can give solace to both personality types, one 
reason, perhaps, why, in my experience, few children or even adults like all of 
science equally. Most, rather, gravitate either towards the biological or the 
physical sciences. This means that we should hesitate before giving too strong 
a human face to all of school science in an attempt to make it more 'relevant'. 
If we do, we may end up with even fewer students wanting to study physics 
and chemistry. 'Relevance' needs to be construed from a multiplicity of 
individual viewpoints rather than absolutised in an essentialist manner. 
 
With that caveat in mind, I would argue that much of school science, 
especially at secondary level, and not just in the UK but world-wide, is still 
too narrow in terms of what is covered in science lessons. Encouragingly, the 
recent history of many school science curricula has been a widening in their 
content and aims in a number of ways. For a start, more applied science is 
now taught in schools and the whole science-and-technology-in-society 
movement has had a considerable impact on school science syllabuses. 
Science is now more likely to be acknowledged, and, in part, taught, as being 
embedded in contexts while more nuanced analyses of the relationships 
between science and technology are now available than was once the case. 
 
In some countries the history of science too makes more of an appearance, 
limited though this still is, than previously. More generally, while the science 
curricula of few countries contain any detailed analysis of the place of science, 
a number of curricula address, at least in part, the question of its nature while 
Gaell Hildebrand (2001) has argued in favour of what she terms 'critical 
activism'. She urges that there should be both participation in science (doing 
science) and participation in debates about science (challenging science). 
 
Associated with the notion of debates about science, an increasing number of 
people have argued that ethics, too, needs to be added to science and science 
education and that pupils need to be helped to argue validly in science. 
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Elsewhere I have argued that science education should aim for social justice 
(Reiss, in press). 
 
In conclusion, my hope is that we will develop a range of science curricula 
and teaching programmes that lead to people, including those who go on to 
study science in one of its manifestations once they have left school, having a 
better understanding of science. I believe that such science teaching will be 
more valid and more satisfying for pupils and teachers alike. 
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